regedit.exe

  • File Path: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regedit.exe
  • Description: Registry Editor

Screenshot

regedit.exe regedit.exe

Hashes

Type Hash
MD5 BD63D72DB4FA96A1E0250B1D36B7A827
SHA1 AAD4B770B25789B7ACD508BF3CF266D4DDB88111
SHA256 F6953923FA9537EDD709488DB8FC17C7991F4F053A904306D9B93D79391FB0E6
SHA384 92D4E0F901D5AF3430017AFCC718309A8B9D2FD77DC09D0AEB131D941B7911CA299B530F87A1BC72BFFC2CA17B94BAD3
SHA512 E68B7A255CD22DCB885A094C24E8FE2C86CD8D1014AA0064917D33DEE96C345FDA594BAAD6D86EC087A2B167CAD9936624AADD5B4953337A4A39E79CA88F8F3C
SSDEEP 6144:58sKRApdUu4oMD/AMv2KBiKQRZ66z+n4VZbd8g79pgrXNgRnVLjyzhbkidNN2:WsIOdYD9+KnQRZ66z24VZbdrpgrXN2LS
IMP C6E1B8202ADED47B7C2380A87886D20C
PESHA1 2132682E836FF49AC4A5DEECF5E31C50B33AF6DF
PE256 3DC67DE93D6A93F64E2ADD59EFEAB85113CD4FC97644B29589FE4A42277BB5FA

Runtime Data

Window Title:

Registry Editor

Open Handles:

Path Type
(R-D) C:\Windows\Fonts\StaticCache.dat File
(R-D) C:\Windows\System32\en-US\aclui.dll.mui File
(R-D) C:\Windows\System32\en-US\duser.dll.mui File
(R-D) C:\Windows\SystemResources\imageres.dll.mun File
(R-D) C:\Windows\SysWOW64\en-US\regedit.exe.mui File
(R-D) C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86_microsoft.windows.c..-controls.resources_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.19041.1_en-us_130e63d987a738df\comctl32.dll.mui File
(RW-) C:\Users\user File
(RW-) C:\Windows File
(RW-) C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86_microsoft.windows.c..-controls.resources_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.19041.1_en-us_130e63d987a738df File
(RW-) C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86_microsoft.windows.common-controls_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.19041.1110_none_a8625c1886757984 File
\BaseNamedObjects\C:*ProgramData*Microsoft*Windows*Caches*{6AF0698E-D558-4F6E-9B3C-3716689AF493}.2.ver0x0000000000000002.db Section
\BaseNamedObjects\C:*ProgramData*Microsoft*Windows*Caches*{DDF571F2-BE98-426D-8288-1A9A39C3FDA2}.2.ver0x0000000000000002.db Section
\BaseNamedObjects\C:*ProgramData*Microsoft*Windows*Caches*cversions.2 Section
\BaseNamedObjects\NLS_CodePage_1252_3_2_0_0 Section
\BaseNamedObjects\NLS_CodePage_437_3_2_0_0 Section
\Sessions\1\Windows\Theme449731986 Section
\Windows\Theme1396518710 Section

Loaded Modules:

Path
C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll
C:\Windows\System32\wow64.dll
C:\Windows\System32\wow64cpu.dll
C:\Windows\System32\wow64win.dll
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regedit.exe

Signature

  • Status: Signature verified.
  • Serial: 33000002EC6579AD1E670890130000000002EC
  • Thumbprint: F7C2F2C96A328C13CDA8CDB57B715BDEA2CBD1D9
  • Issuer: CN=Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US
  • Subject: CN=Microsoft Windows, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US

File Metadata

  • Original Filename: REGEDIT.EXE.MUI
  • Product Name: Microsoft Windows Operating System
  • Company Name: Microsoft Corporation
  • File Version: 10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)
  • Product Version: 10.0.19041.1
  • Language: English (United States)
  • Legal Copyright: Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
  • Machine Type: 32-bit

File Scan

  • VirusTotal Detections: 0/73
  • VirusTotal Link: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f6953923fa9537edd709488db8fc17c7991f4f053a904306d9b93d79391fb0e6/detection

File Similarity (ssdeep match)

File Score
C:\Windows\regedit.exe 79
C:\WINDOWS\regedit.exe 79
C:\WINDOWS\regedit.exe 69
C:\Windows\regedit.exe 100
C:\Windows\regedit.exe 75
C:\Windows\regedit.exe 69
C:\WINDOWS\SysWOW64\regedit.exe 79
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regedit.exe 79
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regedit.exe 75
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regedit.exe 69
C:\WINDOWS\SysWOW64\regedit.exe 69

Possible Misuse

The following table contains possible examples of regedit.exe being misused. While regedit.exe is not inherently malicious, its legitimate functionality can be abused for malicious purposes.

Source Source File Example License
sigma sysmon_regedit_export_to_ads.yml - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSBinaries/Regedit.yml DRL 1.0
sigma sysmon_regedit_export_to_ads.yml Image\|endswith: '\regedit.exe' DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_alternate_data_streams.yml - 'regedit ' DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_export_critical_keys.yml - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSBinaries/Regedit.yml DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_export_critical_keys.yml Image\|endswith: '\regedit.exe' DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_export_keys.yml - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSBinaries/Regedit.yml DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_export_keys.yml Image\|endswith: '\regedit.exe' DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_import_keys.yml description: Detects the import of the specified file to the registry with regedit.exe. DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_import_keys.yml - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSBinaries/Regedit.yml DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_import_keys.yml Image\|endswith: '\regedit.exe' DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_import_keys_ads.yml description: Detects the import of a alternate datastream to the registry with regedit.exe. DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_import_keys_ads.yml - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSBinaries/Regedit.yml DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_import_keys_ads.yml Image\|endswith: '\regedit.exe' DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_susp_regedit_trustedinstaller.yml title: Regedit as Trusted Installer DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_susp_regedit_trustedinstaller.yml description: Detects a regedit started with TrustedInstaller privileges or by ProcessHacker.exe DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_susp_regedit_trustedinstaller.yml Image\|endswith: '\regedit.exe' DRL 1.0
LOLBAS Regedit.yml Name: Regedit.exe  
LOLBAS Regedit.yml - Command: regedit /E c:\ads\file.txt:regfile.reg HKEY_CURRENT_USER\MyCustomRegKey  
LOLBAS Regedit.yml - Command: regedit C:\ads\file.txt:regfile.reg  
LOLBAS Regedit.yml - Path: C:\Windows\System32\regedit.exe  
LOLBAS Regedit.yml - Path: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regedit.exe  
LOLBAS Regedit.yml - IOC: regedit.exe reading and writing to alternate data stream  
LOLBAS Regedit.yml - IOC: regedit.exe should normally not be executed by end-users  
malware-ioc misp_invisimole.json "description": "Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an executable, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. Several different variations of this technique have been observed.\n\nOne variant is for an executable to be placed in a commonly trusted directory or given the name of a legitimate, trusted program. Alternatively, the filename given may be a close approximation of legitimate programs or something innocuous. An example of this is when a common system utility or program is moved and renamed to avoid detection based on its usage.(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018) This is done to bypass tools that trust executables by relying on file name or path, as well as to deceive defenders and system administrators into thinking a file is benign by associating the name with something that is thought to be legitimate.\n\nA third variant uses the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. RTLO is a non-printing character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) For example, a Windows screensaver file named <code>March 25 \\u202Excod.scr</code> will display as <code>March 25 rcs.docx</code>. A JavaScript file named <code>photo_high_re\\u202Egnp.js</code> will be displayed as <code>photo_high_resj.png</code>. A common use of this technique is with spearphishing attachments since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default. \n\nAdversaries may modify a binary's metadata, including such fields as icons, version, name of the product, description, and copyright, to better blend in with the environment and increase chances of deceiving a security analyst or product.(Citation: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017)\n\n### Windows\nIn another variation of this technique, an adversary may use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is moved to a different directory and also renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)\n\nAn example of abuse of trusted locations in Windows would be the <code>C:\\Windows\\System32</code> directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include \"explorer.exe\" and \"svchost.exe\".\n\n### Linux\nAnother variation of this technique includes malicious binaries changing the name of their running process to that of a trusted or benign process, after they have been launched as opposed to before. (Citation: Remaiten)\n\nAn example of abuse of trusted locations in Linux would be the <code>/bin</code> directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binaries include \"rsyncd\" and \"dbus-inotifier\". (Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis) (Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)", © ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc rtm regedit.exe © ESET 2014-2018
atomic-red-team T1564.004.md regedit /E #{path}\file.txt:regfile.reg HKEY_CURRENT_USER\MyCustomRegKey MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
signature-base apt_area1_phishing_diplomacy.yar $regedit = { c7 06 23 01 12 20 c7 46 04 01 90 00 00 89 5e 0c 89 5e 08 e8 CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base apt_project_sauron_extras.yar $x1 = “local t = w.exec2str("regedit “ CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base crime_cn_campaign_njrat.yar $a4 = “taskkill /f /im regedit.exe” fullword ascii CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base gen_recon_indicators.yar $s9 = “regedit -e “ ascii CC BY-NC 4.0

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