runas.exe

  • File Path: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\runas.exe
  • Description: Run As Utility

Hashes

Type Hash
MD5 33FAB7726B2CF776490242088EB27A74
SHA1 2FF5FD323635D7463465A5F6EAD87E5427F14C00
SHA256 DF0F9506081CF4F1037EEB47CAAE141136A93A11838D7223ED0A6FAFDB88011E
SHA384 A5A43E7FC705CFCB36A58BB72DF54D77F6FF55D558F6BC42A6099F462DD6215F00A98DB1164499082EF9F5207A329B7F
SHA512 C34B3CFFDFC9C5798987CED59AD9BA18143FDF8EAC80BA2A3E4B3DF182EA998356E95B0FB7C6557A52CE9117AC023CDCB345053154B15E39E333341205CE25A5
SSDEEP 384:obuRy2PO8G/VVtFHKZkXV7MGXuJEa6NHWFOWaA:o0vZKtKYMaDa6Nip

Signature

  • Status: Signature verified.
  • Serial: 33000000BCE120FDD27CC8EE930000000000BC
  • Thumbprint: E85459B23C232DB3CB94C7A56D47678F58E8E51E
  • Issuer: CN=Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US
  • Subject: CN=Microsoft Windows, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US

File Metadata

  • Original Filename: RUNAS.EXE.MUI
  • Product Name: Microsoft Windows Operating System
  • Company Name: Microsoft Corporation
  • File Version: 10.0.14393.0 (rs1_release.160715-1616)
  • Product Version: 10.0.14393.0
  • Language: English (United States)
  • Legal Copyright: Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

Possible Misuse

The following table contains possible examples of runas.exe being misused. While runas.exe is not inherently malicious, its legitimate functionality can be abused for malicious purposes.

Source Source File Example License
sigma win_overpass_the_hash.yml - Runas command-line tool using /netonly parameter DRL 1.0
sigma win_susp_logon_explicit_credentials.yml - Administrators that use the RunAS command or scheduled tasks DRL 1.0
sigma file_event_win_powershell_exploit_scripts.yml - '\Invoke-RunAs.ps1' DRL 1.0
sigma posh_ps_malicious_commandlets.yml - 'Invoke-RunAs' DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_multiple_suspicious_cli.yml - runas.exe DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_susp_advancedrun.yml - ' /RunAs ' DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_susp_advancedrun_priv_user.yml title: Suspicious AdvancedRun Runas Priv User DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_susp_advancedrun_priv_user.yml - ' /RunAs 8 ' DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_susp_advancedrun_priv_user.yml - ' /RunAs 4 ' DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_susp_advancedrun_priv_user.yml - '/RunAs 8' DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_susp_advancedrun_priv_user.yml - '/RunAs 4' DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_susp_script_exec_from_temp.yml - '-WindowStyle hidden -Verb runAs' # VSCode behaviour if file cannot be written as current user DRL 1.0
sigma registry_event_uac_bypass_sdclt.yml TargetObject\|endswith: Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand DRL 1.0
malware-ioc misp_invisimole.json "description": "Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token. For example, Microsoft promotes the use of access tokens as a security best practice. Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command <code>runas</code>.(Citation: Microsoft runas)\n \nAdversaries may use access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and evade detection. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.(Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)\n\nAccess tokens can be leveraged by adversaries through three methods:(Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)\n\n**Token Impersonation/Theft** - An adversary creates a new access token that duplicates an existing token using <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code>. The token can then be used with <code>ImpersonateLoggedOnUser</code> to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with <code>SetThreadToken</code> to assign the impersonated token to a thread. This is useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.\n\n**Create Process with a Token** - An adversary creates a new access token with <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code> and uses it with <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> to create a new process running under the security context of the impersonated user. This is useful for creating a new process under the security context of a different user.\n\n**Make and Impersonate Token** - An adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system. The adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the <code>LogonUser</code> function. The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use <code>SetThreadToken</code> to assign the token to a thread.\n\nAny standard user can use the <code>runas</code> command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account.\n\nMetasploit’s Meterpreter payload allows arbitrary token manipulation and uses token impersonation to escalate privileges.(Citation: Metasploit access token) The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token impersonation and can also create tokens. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Access Token)", © ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc rtm lpe-runas-flags © ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc rtm runas © ESET 2014-2018
atomic-red-team T1207.md $dc = Start-Process -FilePath cmd.exe -Verb Runas -ArgumentList “/c #{psexec_path} /accepteula -d -s #{mimikatz_path} $mimikatzParam” MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team T1558.001.md # create batch file with commands to run in a separate “runas /netonly” session MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team T1558.001.md # its output goes to golden.txt temp file, because we cannot capture “runas /netonly” output otherwise MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team T1558.001.md echo “foo” | runas /netonly /user:fake “$env:TEMP\golden.bat” | Out-Null MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team T1588.002.md #{local_folder}#{local_executable} /EXEFilename “C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe” /WindowState 0 /CommandLine “stop WinDefend” /StartDirectory “” /RunAs 8 /Run MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
atomic-red-team T1588.002.md #{local_folder}#{local_executable} “C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe” /WindowState 0 /CommandLine “rmdir ‘C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender’ -Recurse” /StartDirectory “” /RunAs 8 /Run MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
signature-base apt_between-hk-and-burma.yar $file8 = “\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\runas.exe” CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base exploit_uac_elevators.yar $s2 = “runas” wide CC BY-NC 4.0

MIT License. Copyright (c) 2020-2021 Strontic.