regedit.exe

  • File Path: C:\windows\SysWOW64\regedit.exe
  • Description: Registry Editor

Screenshot

regedit.exe regedit.exe

Hashes

Type Hash
MD5 2F3FED31AC2846D8AD5DBC396A7E3DF1
SHA1 36A13E7F9BB93218695B391B387407B9C197C1BA
SHA256 BBD0BE7BD07C90AA690C6484B765D19A02BF5C60841D6497D8395BC5B1F976D2
SHA384 297711041E53C5261D54030B1EDD21497A41FBB35454F8BD7E01DC3FA4A95DA8EF3932B5BAA68B8AA28A824D6E5868FC
SHA512 D4ECE2A453CFCB59764AEAC1D9502B1CF1C8284E7C243F4DAAF20AE10F7C6F59326049807183F8669C96ECE3BFE52D21668AED5EDB64C52737508A29F8058C19
SSDEEP 3072:8BELTnC0NTvQRIxqq5iggYNf28JdVgpgw073s7jKQCL1f:8BEXvaRIUqce0iP73s7jZG

Signature

  • Status: The file C:\windows\SysWOW64\regedit.exe is not digitally signed. You cannot run this script on the current system. For more information about running scripts and setting execution policy, see about_Execution_Policies at http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=135170
  • Serial: ``
  • Thumbprint: ``
  • Issuer:
  • Subject:

File Metadata

  • Original Filename: REGEDIT.EXE.MUI
  • Product Name: Microsoft Windows Operating System
  • Company Name: Microsoft Corporation
  • File Version: 6.3.9600.16384 (winblue_rtm.130821-1623)
  • Product Version: 6.3.9600.16384
  • Language: English (United States)
  • Legal Copyright: Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

File Similarity (ssdeep match)

File Score
C:\windows\regedit.exe 100

Possible Misuse

The following table contains possible examples of regedit.exe being misused. While regedit.exe is not inherently malicious, its legitimate functionality can be abused for malicious purposes.

Source Source File Example License
sigma sysmon_regedit_export_to_ads.yml - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSBinaries/Regedit.yml DRL 1.0
sigma sysmon_regedit_export_to_ads.yml Image\|endswith: '\regedit.exe' DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_alternate_data_streams.yml - 'regedit ' DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_export_critical_keys.yml - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSBinaries/Regedit.yml DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_export_critical_keys.yml Image\|endswith: '\regedit.exe' DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_export_keys.yml - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSBinaries/Regedit.yml DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_export_keys.yml Image\|endswith: '\regedit.exe' DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_import_keys.yml description: Detects the import of the specified file to the registry with regedit.exe. DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_import_keys.yml - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSBinaries/Regedit.yml DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_import_keys.yml Image\|endswith: '\regedit.exe' DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_import_keys_ads.yml description: Detects the import of a alternate datastream to the registry with regedit.exe. DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_import_keys_ads.yml - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSBinaries/Regedit.yml DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_regedit_import_keys_ads.yml Image\|endswith: '\regedit.exe' DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_susp_regedit_trustedinstaller.yml title: Regedit as Trusted Installer DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_susp_regedit_trustedinstaller.yml description: Detects a regedit started with TrustedInstaller privileges or by ProcessHacker.exe DRL 1.0
sigma proc_creation_win_susp_regedit_trustedinstaller.yml Image\|endswith: '\regedit.exe' DRL 1.0
LOLBAS Regedit.yml Name: Regedit.exe  
LOLBAS Regedit.yml - Command: regedit /E c:\ads\file.txt:regfile.reg HKEY_CURRENT_USER\MyCustomRegKey  
LOLBAS Regedit.yml - Command: regedit C:\ads\file.txt:regfile.reg  
LOLBAS Regedit.yml - Path: C:\Windows\System32\regedit.exe  
LOLBAS Regedit.yml - Path: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regedit.exe  
LOLBAS Regedit.yml - IOC: regedit.exe reading and writing to alternate data stream  
LOLBAS Regedit.yml - IOC: regedit.exe should normally not be executed by end-users  
malware-ioc misp_invisimole.json "description": "Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an executable, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. Several different variations of this technique have been observed.\n\nOne variant is for an executable to be placed in a commonly trusted directory or given the name of a legitimate, trusted program. Alternatively, the filename given may be a close approximation of legitimate programs or something innocuous. An example of this is when a common system utility or program is moved and renamed to avoid detection based on its usage.(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018) This is done to bypass tools that trust executables by relying on file name or path, as well as to deceive defenders and system administrators into thinking a file is benign by associating the name with something that is thought to be legitimate.\n\nA third variant uses the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. RTLO is a non-printing character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) For example, a Windows screensaver file named <code>March 25 \\u202Excod.scr</code> will display as <code>March 25 rcs.docx</code>. A JavaScript file named <code>photo_high_re\\u202Egnp.js</code> will be displayed as <code>photo_high_resj.png</code>. A common use of this technique is with spearphishing attachments since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default. \n\nAdversaries may modify a binary's metadata, including such fields as icons, version, name of the product, description, and copyright, to better blend in with the environment and increase chances of deceiving a security analyst or product.(Citation: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017)\n\n### Windows\nIn another variation of this technique, an adversary may use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is moved to a different directory and also renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)\n\nAn example of abuse of trusted locations in Windows would be the <code>C:\\Windows\\System32</code> directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include \"explorer.exe\" and \"svchost.exe\".\n\n### Linux\nAnother variation of this technique includes malicious binaries changing the name of their running process to that of a trusted or benign process, after they have been launched as opposed to before. (Citation: Remaiten)\n\nAn example of abuse of trusted locations in Linux would be the <code>/bin</code> directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binaries include \"rsyncd\" and \"dbus-inotifier\". (Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis) (Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)", © ESET 2014-2018
malware-ioc rtm regedit.exe © ESET 2014-2018
atomic-red-team T1564.004.md regedit /E #{path}\file.txt:regfile.reg HKEY_CURRENT_USER\MyCustomRegKey MIT License. © 2018 Red Canary
signature-base apt_area1_phishing_diplomacy.yar $regedit = { c7 06 23 01 12 20 c7 46 04 01 90 00 00 89 5e 0c 89 5e 08 e8 CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base apt_project_sauron_extras.yar $x1 = “local t = w.exec2str("regedit “ CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base crime_cn_campaign_njrat.yar $a4 = “taskkill /f /im regedit.exe” fullword ascii CC BY-NC 4.0
signature-base gen_recon_indicators.yar $s9 = “regedit -e “ ascii CC BY-NC 4.0

MIT License. Copyright (c) 2020-2021 Strontic.